Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee.

Good morning. My name is Joseph A. Bosco. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss China's posture toward Taiwan and the implications for United States security policy. In light of the time limitations, I have submitted my full statement for the record.

A few weeks ago, Georgetown University's Asian Studies Program commemorated the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, "the forgotten war." Of the many lessons that conflict painfully taught, certainly the most important was the need to communicate clearly to potential adversaries America's commitment to our own security interests and those of our friends and allies.

Historians blame Secretary of State Acheson's National Press Club speech in January 1950 for triggering the war because he described a Western security perimeter that did not include South Korea. That was seen as a green light for North Korea to invade the South with impunity and carry out its "one Korea" reunification policy.

Acheson argued in his memoir that he (and General Macarthur, who described the same defense line earlier) hadn't explicitly said we would not defend South Korea; his speech, after all, did cite "the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations . .[to] . .any people . . determined to protect their independence against outside aggression." We might retroactively describe that policy as one of "strategic ambiguity."

The murky commitment to South Korea applied also to Taiwan (or Formosa), one of the "other areas of the Pacific" Acheson left outside the defense line. But the principle of international law he declared and applied to both of those Asian flash points was, and is, important: a military attack by one established self-governing part of a divided nation against the other self-governing part constitutes "outside aggression" and that is precisely how the United Nations judged North Korea's invasion of the South and Communist China's participation in the war.

For too long, that important lesson of the Korean War has been forgotten or ignored. The international community has been silent as Beijing proclaims its presumed "right" to incorporate Taiwan by force, which it repeated again during Secretary Cohen's visit to China a few days ago. When North Korea crossed the 38th parallel, it transgressed what was intended as an interim line on a map drawn only five years earlier and the world rightly condemned it as a violation of South Korea's sovereignty. How much more serious would be a Chinese attack across the Taiwan Strait, 100 miles of open seas between Taiwan and the Mainland, an international waterway through which pass much of the world's oil and other commerce»after a half-century of separate governmental existence.

In 1995 and 1996 we saw a small hint of the international repercussions that would follow if China were to reignite the civil war that ended 51 years ago. When Beijing launched missiles across the Taiwan Strait and conducted live-fire exercises, they closed not only Taiwan's ports but the entire Strait, as international flights and ocean shipping were halted or diverted, trade was disrupted, and insurance rates and other costs soared. That was a clear violation of the United

Nations Law of the Sea Convention, which prohibits non-peaceful uses of international straits, as well as the U.N. Charter, which outlaws both the use and the threat of force. But the world community was largely silent.

What, then, of current American policy on Taiwan? While China says it will follow North Korea's earlier example and will use force, if necessary, to bring Taiwan under its control, it wants to do so without risking war with the United States. In December 1995, Chinese officials directly asked their American counterparts how Washington would react if China attacked Taiwan. Instead of a clear and direct deterrent response that would have put the matter to rest, the answer they got from the world's only superpower was: "We don't know and you don't know; it would depend on the circumstances." So, naturally, Beijing keeps probing to find the right "circumstances" under which it will be free to attack Taiwan without fear of the consequences. Its list of pretexts for military action continues to grow»if Taiwan declares independence, if it makes moves in that direction, if it amends its constitution to reflect two states, or even if it simply takes too long to accept Beijing's rule under its "one China principle."

By failing to protest such threats as unacceptable violations of international law and the United Nations Charter, Washington tacitly accepts China's premise of a legal "right" to attack Taiwan. Public engagement with Beijing on this issue would be healthy and prudent for all concerned. The bottom line with China ought to be the same as it is today with North Korea: not just that we prefer a peaceful resolution to these unification claims, but, backed by international law and in the interest of regional peace and stability, we will simply not allow them to be settled by force. That, after all, was the original basis on which the United States and other countries switched recognition from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China and the PRC was admitted to the United Nations as a "peace-loving" state.

What does all this have to do with PNTR? The key words are "permanent" and "normal." There is substantial evidence that China has muted both its rhetoric and its actions toward Taiwan during the period Congress has been considering the legislation. To the extent PNTR's fate serves as a disincentive for rash action by Beijing, that leverage will obviously be lost when the bill is passed by the Senate and becomes law. China will then no longer have to worry about annual review of its international behavior»unless some kind of safeguard is included in the legislation itself. Historians should not look back on the passage of PNTR as a signal to Chinese hardliners that aggression against Taiwan under the "right circumstances" would be accepted by the American government.

As for the question of how "normal" our relations really are with China, the very fact that the United States constantly has to consider the question of war in the Taiwan Strait, or China's proliferation of nuclear and missile technology to North Korea, Iran, Libya, and other rogue states ("of concern") speaks for itself. China's assistance to Pakistan helped trigger a nuclear arms race with India, with grave consequences for the subcontinent and the entire region and one more headache for the United States as the world's stabilizing power. "The United States will play the role of a fire brigade. Rushing from one place to another to extinguish fires." That was the warning of Beijing's top arms control negotiator the other day: China would proliferate weapons of mass destruction if Washington proceeds with missile defense. But, of course, that is

the situation we face today; Beijing threatens to do what it is already doing.

In its military doctrine and strategic planning, China considers America its primary potential enemy. On the day of Secretary Cohen's arrival in Beijing, the headline in China's official press read: r"U.S. Greatest Threat to World Peace." The Secretary noted a pattern of "confrontational Chinese rhetoric assigning hostile motives to American foreign policy" and warned that it presented "a danger [of] . . . serious miscalculations." Clearly, Chinese and American perceptions of international reality diverge dramatically, despite twenty years of engagement. It is fair to ask, then, how realistic it is to expect normal trade relations with a country with which we have such abnormal security relations.

It is a foregone conclusion that PNTR will be approved and signed into law. The only question is whether Congress will attach any conditions to its approval. Taiwan is the most immediate question that threatens to draw China and the United States into direct military conflict, and, like the Korean War half a century ago, it would happen not by design but by the kind of miscalculation Secretary Cohen warns about. Consideration of this legislation, therefore, seems an appropriate vehicle to convey a clear and direct message to China: short of an attack by Taiwan on China, the United States will defend the security of Taiwan. Only strategic clarity will ensure regional stability and peace.

The House vote on PNTR demonstrated that for this administration and this Congress, trade trumps human rights. The question the Senate will decide, given China's proliferation of nuclear and missile technology, its aggression toward Taiwan, and its threats to the United States, is whether trade also trumps America's national security.

The Washington Post

May 26, 1998, Tuesday, Final Edition

SECTION: OP-ED; Pg. A17

LENGTH: 823 words

HEADLINE: Time to Be Clear On Taiwan

BYLINE: Joseph A. Bosco

BODY:

President Clinton's accelerated visit to China ominously recalls previous summits in which an American president was either unprepared or too eager: Kennedy-Khrushchev in Vienna, Reagan-Gorbachev in Reykjavik and, most dramatically, FDR and Stalin at Yalta. The law of unintended consequences also applies to summits.

Like Berlin, Cuba or Eastern Europe during the Cold War, Taiwan is the flash point between the United States and China today. That was highlighted during Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's recent China trip preparing for the first, and highly symbolic, visit of a U.S. president since the 1989 events in Tiananmen Square.

Despite American accommodation on human rights, weapons proliferation and trade, Foreign Minister Tian Jiaxuan made it clear that China wants further concessions on the contentious issue of Taiwan. Specifically, Beijing is dissatisfied with continued American defense assistance to the island under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which it considers interference in its "internal" affairs, and with the slow pace of talks with Taiwan.

During the Jiang visit last November, President Clinton yielded to Chinese pressure by urging Taipei to get on with negotiations with China: "Sooner is better than later." While dialogue between potential adversaries is generally desirable, Beijing invariably casts it as Taiwanese acquiescence to its own "one-China" formulation and demands that it lead to progress on "reunification." But even those on Taiwan favoring reunion over independence make clear they voluntarily will join only a democratic China.

After the Jiang visit, the Clinton administration increased the pressure on Taiwan. A stream of former American officials descended on Taipei urging Taiwanese leaders to revive the stalled talks with Beijing and to cool the rhetoric about political independence. Taiwan got the orchestrated message and agreed to resume cross-Strait discussions, though substantive progress is halting at best.

But Taipei also reacted in a different way to Washington's pressure tactics. Soon after the Jiang visit, President Lee Teng-hui told The Post that Taiwan already "is an independent and sovereign country." Many took this as a glass-half-full declaration that Taiwan can accept de facto independence as the long-term status quo. Beijing, however, was not so sanguine; the Chinese leadership reacts viscerally to President Lee's repeated statements and actions emphasizing a separate Taiwan identity.

If President Clinton again acquiesces to Chinese pressures and again passes them on to Taiwan, the results could be equally counterproductive -- especially because legislative elections will be held in the fall and relations with the mainland will be a major campaign issue in Taiwan. The last time Taiwan held national elections, in 1996, Beijing reacted violently both to Taiwan's vivid demonstration of a Chinese people's capacity for democracy and to the growing strength of the independence movement. China fired missiles into Taiwan's waters and assembled the largest military operation it had ever conducted, disrupting international commerce through the Taiwan Strait, closing Taiwan's ports and damaging its economy.

In response, the United States deployed its greatest concentration of naval force in Asia since the Vietnam War. As a Sino-American confrontation loomed, China escalated its exercises and rhetoric. Bristling at renewed American "interference," Beijing threatened a "sea of fire" if the carriers entered the strait (as the Nimitz had done during a similar threatening exercise in 1995). To drive their point home, a high-level Chinese official warned of nuclear missiles on Los

Angeles if the United States went too far in defending Taiwan. The carriers stayed out of the strait, the exercises continued and petered out, and the crisis dissipated -- until next time.

To ensure that there is no next time, President Clinton needs to address Taiwan in two ways on his China trip. First, he should refrain from making any further concessions to Beijing in the form of either reduced American defense support for Taiwan or increased diplomatic pressure on Taiwan to engage with China other than as an equal and uncoerced negotiating partner.

Second, he must make clear to Beijing that Taiwan's status and its relationship with the mainland will be determined by the Taiwanese in accordance with the principles set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act and the United Nations Charter -- freely and peacefully.

America's policy of "strategic ambiguity" has failed; only strategic clarity will prevent another dangerous miscalculation. As past summits demonstrate, success depends on adherence to core values and sound negotiating strategy; reliance on a president's vaunted personal charm can sometimes do more harm than good.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States.

The Christian Science Monitor

May 30, 2000, Tuesday

SECTION: OPINION; Pg. 11

LENGTH: 910 words

HEADLINE: US should get back to basics on 'one China' policy

BYLINE: Joseph Bosco

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:

China's hard-liners can claim vindication in congressional approval of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR). Despite escalating threats against Taiwan (and the United States), continued proliferation of prohibited technology to rogue states, and intensified political and religious repression of its people, the international community has welcomed China as a "normal" trading partner.

With the House vote behind it and Senate approval assured, Beijing is now free to confront the fact that on Taiwan itself, the irresistible force has met the immovable object: Chen Shui-bian, its

bte noire, assumed the presidency on May 20 without yielding to Beijing's ultimatum that he accept the "one China" principle conceding mainland sovereignty over the island. To do so, Chen said, would have made him "unfit" to lead Taiwan, though he did offer other concessions to Beijing.

Now it is China's move; having failed again to rattle Taiwan's leaders or cow its voters, it may feel compelled to act on its threats.

The Clinton administration, which had pressured Chen not to do or say anything to provoke China, also cautioned Beijing against riling Congress before the vote on PNTR. Willing to bide its time during that delicate period, Beijing must understand that American opposition to the use of force against Taiwan isn't a transitory policy to suit legislative politics, but a bedrock principle of Sino-American relations.

The administration should jump at recent suggestions that Beijing and Taipei might now welcome US mediation in the conflict. Despite past reluctance to play that role, Washington should seize the opportunity to clarify its dangerously contradictory policies on the China-Taiwan issue. Antagonizing one or both of the parties holds less risk than allowing the situation to drift toward war.

Washington has good reason to resist interposing itself between Beijing and Taipei: Their positions are fundamentally irreconcilable. China wants Taiwan to accept Communist rule, supposedly watered-down under a "one country, two systems approach"; Taiwan's government and people, having discarded the old Kuomintang dictatorship, will not agree to surrender any part of their hard-won democracy.

China has painted itself into a corner with its growing list of pretexts to attack Taiwan. But outmoded and counterproductive American policies have contributed to the inexorable momentum toward confrontation.

Washington originally left it to the parties to determine what "one China" means as long as it is decided by peaceful means. But successive administrations have gradually accepted Beijing's view that the People's Republic of China is the one China, and that Taiwan deserves no separate international space.

Paradoxically, even as Taipei followed American advice and democratized its regime, Washington's policy has shifted from studied neutrality to a decidedly pro-China tilt. Where we once encouraged a peaceful "resolution," we now prejudge the negotiations and approve peaceful "reunification."

At the same time, the US adheres to the concept of "strategic ambiguity," even though its underlying premise has eroded. The original idea was that by avoiding a clear commitment to Taiwan's defense - saying "it would depend on the circumstances" - Washington discouraged adventurism on either side of the Taiwan strait: Beijing would avoid action that might invite an American response, and Taipei would not utter words that could antagonize China. But the

doctrine of deliberate vagueness eventually backfired as each side probed the limits of tolerable behavior.

Chen has clearly tried to break the cycle by abandoning many of the positions of his pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party and seeking unconditional cross-strait dialogue. But China has rejected his peace overtures and moved in the opposite direction, escalating its military threats and undermining the premise of the United States' recognition of the People's Republic of China: No use of force against Taiwan.

With little room to maneuver at this late date in contemporary China-US relations, Washington could still calm the situation by explicitly reframing the core positions of American policy:

1. The United States will not recognize a formal declaration of Taiwan's independence and will discourage other nations from doing so. A declaration lacking international acceptance would be a symbolic but legally meaningless gesture, neither requiring nor justifying China's military response.

2. A Chinese military move against Taiwan, for any reason short of a Taiwanese attack on the mainland, would bring an immediate American military, economic, and diplomatic response, including recognition of Taiwan's independence (worsening Sino-US diplomatic relations already jeopardized by any military confrontation).

3. Whether Taiwan ultimately joins with the mainland in some form must be arranged through peaceful, uncoerced negotiations and the democratic decision of the government and people of Taiwan.

Only strategic and moral clarity will ensure stability across the Taiwan Strait and peace in the region, and only the United States can provide that clarity.

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Los Angeles Times

June 26, 2000, Monday, Home Edition

SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 9; Op Ed Desk

LENGTH: 707 words

HEADLINE: COMMENTARY;
CHINA NOW HAS A ROLE MODEL TO FOLLOW TOWARD PEACE--THE KOREAS;
ASIA: TAIWAN'S NEW PRESIDENT HAS TRIED TO INITIATE TALKS. BEIJING, MEANWHILE, IS FEELING OUT U.S. COMMITMENT.

BYLINE: JOSEPH A. BOSCO, Joseph A. Bosco teaches a graduate seminar in China- Taiwan, relations at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service
BODY:

Will China follow North Korea as willingly on its path to peace today as it did on the road to war 50 years ago? In 1950, Beijing joined its "little communist brother" in an ill-fated war to unify the Korean peninsula under Pyongyang's "one Korea" system, just as China claimed the right to forcibly incorporate Taiwan under its rule. The United Nations condemned both countries for aggression.

Two weeks ago, North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Il (whose father unleashed the war), welcomed South Korea's president, Kim Dae Jung, to Pyongyang in a historic meeting of reconciliation. Taiwan's newly elected president, Chen Shui-bian, like Chinese leader Jiang Zemin, praised the efforts of the two Kims to undertake peaceful talks and reduce long-standing tensions.

Chen backed up his positive words with positive action by inviting Jiang to a similar summit meeting. So far, his overtures have been rebuffed. Unlike the creative statesmanship demonstrated by the two Korean leaders, who met without preconditions, Beijing still insists that no dialogue with Taipei is possible until it first accepts the "one-China principle" conceding the mainland's sovereignty over Taiwan.

As China's leaders know, American policies toward the situation on the Korean peninsula and the standoff between China and Taiwan are inextricably linked. The Truman administration originally evinced little interest in either place. When Secretary of State Dean Acheson outlined Washington's security perimeter in the Far East in his famous National Press Club speech in January 1950, he failed to include South Korea. Seeing a green light, the leaders in Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang agreed on the North Korean attack across the 38th Parallel.

President Truman not only rallied to the defense of South Korea, but he also deployed the 7th Fleet to protect the Republic of China on Taiwan against a similar breakout move by mainland China. The United States entered into a defense treaty with Taiwan that lasted until 1979, when President Carter switched American recognition to the People's Republic of China in Beijing.

By that time, however, America's relations with the people and government of Taiwan had deepened to the point that Congress would not accept an abandonment of its former ally. It overwhelmingly passed the Taiwan Relations Act that, while not formally committing Washington to Taiwan's defense, made any threat to its security "a matter of grave concern" and

pledged to arm it with all necessary defensive weapons.

During the past half-century of Cold War and post-Cold War tensions, the Korean peninsula and the China-Taiwan dispute have remained two of the world's most dangerous flash points, directly implicating American security interests. But unlike the clear statement of U.S. intention to defend South Korea, the wiggle room in American policy toward Taiwan has evolved into a deliberate doctrine of "strategic ambiguity."

When Chinese officials asked their American counterparts in December 1995 whether Washington would defend Taiwan against an attack, they were told "it would depend on the circumstances." Beijing has been probing ever since to determine which "circumstances" would constitute a green light more reliable than the one they thought they saw on Korea 50 years ago. Chinese missile firings across the Taiwan Strait brought two U.S. carrier battle groups to the region in 1996. Yet China keeps trying, and now has deployed hundreds of missiles along the coast facing Taiwan.

North Korea's own missile program showed again the ties between Korean tensions and the China-Taiwan situation. Pyongyang's recent firing of a medium-range ballistic missile over Japan's air space accelerated American and Japanese interest in a theater missile defense system. Beijing was quick to condemn this as a shield to protect Taiwan against Chinese missiles, which it might well become.

Chen keeps trying to break the ice with Beijing and hopes China and Taiwan can emulate the two Koreas in talks instead of military buildups. But as he notes, good will cannot come from only one side. North Korea's reclusive Kim may prove the more adept diplomat and enlightened peacemaker than China's well-traveled Jiang.

GRAPHIC: GRAPHIC-DRAWING: (no caption), ARCADIO ESQUIVEL, La Nacion, San Jose, Costa Rica

[Talking piece]

Enemies and Strategic Partners: Has China Declared War on the United States?

Mirroring the changed perspective in the Clinton administration, think-tank and academic circles no longer refer to China as a "strategic partner"; increasingly, one hears terms like "strategic competitor" (favored by presidential candidate George W. Bush). China's moves on Taiwan and in the South China Sea are less likely to be seen as defensive, protective, and inward-looking rather than as aggressive and expansionist. Tentative analogies to Japan's policies in the 1930's are occasionally whispered even in moderate policy circles. In his later years, William Safire tells us, Richard Nixon began to question what he had wrought in "the week that changed the world"--worrying whether his opening to China "may have created a Frankenstein['s monster]."

Over the past two decades, China policy debate has been reduced to the question of engagement

vs. containment, or as their respective opponents label the approaches in polar terms, appeasement vs. confrontation. Successive administrations have argued that integrating China into the international system would favorably modify its behavior and encourage it to play by international rules. Isolating and containing it, on the other hand, would foster both domestic repression and external aggression. "Treat China as an enemy and it will be an enemy" has been the conventional warning refrain.

Engagement proponents in the executive branch and Congress, in both political parties, have largely prevailed in the debate, with accession to the Word Trade Organization and approval of Permanent Normal Trade Relations only the latest efforts to win China's friendship or at least its cooperation. Having thus treated China not as an enemy but as a trading partner if not a strategic partner, it is pertinent to ask how China sees and responds to the West, and especially the United States. Put another way, had Washington decided instead to treat China as an "enemy," how would it have responded in its internal strategic doctrine, and its external policies and behavior? Indeed, how should we define an "enemy" state in the post-Cold War period?

A check-list of hypothetical adversarial characteristics and behavior that might be expected from a hostile China and that could lead inexorably to open military confrontation would include the following:

(1) a history of prior enmity and outright conflict with the U.S.

(2) a hostile ideology and a fundamentally opposing value system

(3) a domestic and external propaganda campaign consistently portraying the U.S. in the worst possible light as a hegemonic, oppressive, interfering superpower

(4) an aggressive effort to obtain American weapons technology by sale, theft, and other open and covert means

(5) a strategic military doctrine of asymmetrical warfare built around a posited American enemy

(6) a nuclear and conventional military buildup targeted at U.S. facilities, assets, and allies

(7) a political and diplomatic strategy at the United Nations and in other international forums designed to thwart American policies and damage U.S. interests worldwide

(8) an economic strategy to exploit bilateral trade arrangements with the U.S. and to utilize the proceeds for further military buildup directed at U.S. forces and U.S. friends and allies

(9) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology to rogue states and other proclaimed and potential adversaries of the U.S. (e.g., North Korea, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Libya) under the philosophy: "the enemy of my enemy is my friend"

(10) policy coordination with such states, to diffuse American power around the world: "The

U.S. will play the role of a fire brigade. Rushing from one place to another to extinguish fires."

(11) purchases of advanced-technology weapons systems from Russia in strategic partnership and virtual alliance against United States "hegemonic" policies

(12) acquisition of far-flung geostrategic facilities and assets replacing or competing with U.S. positions (Panama Canal, Venezuelan and Central Asian oilfields)

(13) a political, diplomatic, and psychological campaign of intimidation against American allies intended to weaken their U.S. ties particularly in a case of potential military conflict

(14) increasing frequency of explicit military threats, including use of nuclear weapons, against Taiwan and the U.S. in public statements and at American policy conferences ("The U.S. cares more about Los Angeles than it does about Taiwan,")

That ominous gallery of threats and dangers might have been America's fate had we chosen the path of containment and confrontation with China. Fortunately, we opted for engagement and cooperation.